Thucydides, "History Of The Peloponnesian War"

The war between Athens and Sparta offers a unique look at the poles of human experience.

Galloway Institute

Feb 21, 2021

Index

BOOK I - (479 - 432 BC)

Sparta's Strength Is in Its Strong Public Spirit - [Enjoyed good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was unbroken]
Thucydides' Purpose for Writing - [not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time]
The Corinthians Explain the Difference Between Athenians and Spartans - [they were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to give none to others]
Thoughts on Indignation: Legal Wrong v. Violent Wrong - [More excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong]
Archidamus' Foreign Policy Maxim - [Be careful not to allow complaints cascade into war]
Spartan Disposition: Both Warlike and Wise - [We are both warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order that makes us so]
Why Sparta Voted for War: Fear of Athens' Growing Power - [war must be declared]
Pacifism May Actually Lead a Nation into Greater Dangers - [To refuse to abandon repose for war is not so sure a method of avoiding danger]
Wise Negotiation Principle - [If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand]
Foreign Policy Maxim: Do Not Yield to Force - [For all claims from an equal urged upon a neighbor as commands before any attempt at legal settlement is slavery]
Fundamental Problem With Leagues or Confederacy - [The common cause imperceptibly decays]
The Opportunities of War Wait for No Man
Pericles Convinces the Athenian's to Value Their Freedom Over Their Property - [Lay waste to your own homes, show the Peloponnesians that this at any rate will not make you submit]
Pericles Concludes with Rallying the Athenians to War - [Out of the Greatest Dangers communities and Individual Acquire the Greatest Glory]

BOOK II - (431 - 429 BC)

Both Sides Were Enthusiastic at the Start of the War - [Zeal is always at its height at the commencement of an undertaking]
Archidamus' Wisdom: The Course of War Cannot Be Foreseen - [by this combination be best inspired for dealing a blow, and best secured against receiving one]
Archidamus' Psychological Warfare: Athenians Will Rush to Action - [in the habit of invading and ravaging their neighbours' territory, than of seeing their own treated in the like fashion]
Pericles' Wisdom: Praise and Envy - [when this point is passed, envy comes in and with it incredulity]
Pericles' Explains the Source of Athenian Greatness - [The freedom which we enjoin in our government extends also to our ordinary life]
Freedom of Speech - Discussion Produces Wise Decisions - [An indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all]
Pericles' Views Athens as a City on a Hill - [Athens is the school of Hellas, the model city-state]
Pericles On the Spectacle of Politics: He Views Athens as Something Inherently Good and Beautiful - [Feed your eyes upon her from day to day, till love of her fills your heart, duty to protect and sustain Athens]
The Plague Affected the Spirit of the Athenian Citizenry - [Fear of gods or law of man there was none to restrain the Athenians from devolving into unbridled license]
Wisdom on When the Public is Suffering and Distraught - [People make their recollection fit in with their sufferings]
Pericles Rebukes the Athenians for their Lack of Faith Seeing Sparta Lay Waste to their land - [The state can support the misfortunes of private citizens, while they cannot support hers]
Pericles Explains the Burdens of Empire - [Cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share its honors]
Pericles Posits Athenian's Greatness to her Fortitude: Never Bent to Disaster - [They whose minds are least sensitive to calamity, and whose hands are most quick to meet it, are the greatest men and the greatest communities]
The Genius of Pericles' Strategy is Forgotten By Vain Leaders And Squandered On Vain Projects - [Projects whose success would only conduce to the honour and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war]
Pericles' Statesmanship - [Exercised independent control over the multitude. Could lead the people instead of being led by them]
Pericles's Successors Tragically Lacked Statesmanship - [Committed the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude, producing a host of blunders]

BOOK III - (428 - 426 BC)

Diodotus Argues for Calm Deliberation Without Haste or Passion in Lesbos Affair - [Haste usually goes hand in hand with folly]
Diodotus on the Good Citizen and Wise City - [In this way successful orators would be least tempted to sacrifice their convictions to popularity]
Prudence Case Study: Diodotus Argues That Justice, Punishing the Mytilene, Is Not in Athens's Interest - [We are not in a court of justice, but a political assembly]
Corcyraean Revolution: Political Violence Opens Doors to Personal Violence - [the Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those of their fellow citizens whom they regarded as their enemies]
Corcyraean Revolution: Political Violence Opens Doors to Personal Violence - [the Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those of their fellow citizens whom they regarded as their enemies]
The Peloponnesian War Saw Countless Bloody Revolutions Due to Ideological Split - [were made by the popular chiefs to bring in the Athenians, and by the oligarchs to introduce the Lacedaemonians]
Reflection on the Nature of Civil War: War Proves a Rough Master - [In peace and prosperity, states and individuals have better sentiments. Not met with imperious necessities]
Thucydides describes the evils of revolution - [Words had to change their meaning, honor defiled, revenge, ambition, power, reprisals, treachery, death]
Thucydides Describes the Cause of Revolutions - Moderate Citizens Perish Between Extremes - [Good of the state was abandoned, the party caprice of the moment their only standard]
Revolution Puts People on Guard: Blunter Wits Prevailed - [Honor was laughed down and disappeared; and society became dived into camps in which no man trusted his fellow]
Civil War and Revolution Provide Insight Into Human Nature - [Men become hurried and confused by ungovernable passions. Rebel against the law, fall into madness]

BOOK IV - (425 - 423 BC)

The Surrender of the Spartans at Pylos -[Nothing that happened in the war surprised the Hellenes so much as this]
Hermocrates Opines on Human Nature and War - [the incalculable element in the future exercise the wildest influence]
Hermocrates on Unity Against Foreign Aggression - [I am not inclined to ruin myself for the sake of hurting my enemies]
Athenian Success Breeds Hubris - [Extraordinary successes lead people to confuse their strength with their hopes]

BOOK V - (422 - 416 BC)

Brasidas' Strategic Prudence - [Seize the opportunity of the moment]
Spartan Attitude Before the Battle of Mantinea - [Long training of action was of more saving virtue than any brief verbal exhortation]
Spartan Victory at Mantinea Shifted the War Outlook Back in Their Favor - [fortune, it was thought, might have humbled them, but the men themselves were the same as ever]
Athenian View of Empire and Human Nature - [The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must]
The Burden of Empire & Tyranny - [Athens must subdue Melos to keep the respect of its subjects]
Athens is Making the Same Argument Persia Made to Get the Greeks to Submit - [upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or ruin]

BOOK VI - (416 - 414 BC)

Alcibiades the Arrogant - [Views the Sicilians the same way the Persians viewed the Greeks]
Burdens of Empire - Insatiable Need for New Conquests - [if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves]
Nicias Reveals a Flaw With Democracy: People Fear Social Pressure Just As Much as Offending a Absolute King - [The few feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it, and so kept quiet]
Hermocrates Tries To Rally Allies to Defend Syracuse from Athens - [A man can control his own desires but he cannot likewise control circumstances]
Alcibiades Defects to Sparta and Advises them How to Defeat Athens - [the surest method of harming an enemy being to find out what he most fears]
Alcibiades Suggest He Is Trying to Recover His Country, Not Betray It - [A true lover of his country is he who longs for it so much that he will go all lengths to recover it]

BOOK VII - (414 - 413 BC)

Inability to Subdue the Syracusans Demoralizes the Athenians - [Athenian defeat at sea was extremely embarrassing]
Gylippus' Advises to Check People in What They Consider their Special Excellence - [Beating Athens at sea has a profound moral effect]
Gylippus' Inspires His Troops to Liberate Sicily & Exact Vengeance Upon Athens - [And the rarest dangers are those in which failure brings little loss and success the greatest advantage.]
Athenian Defeat at Syracuse was a Lamentable Scene - [calling again and again upon heaven and shrieking aloud as they were left behind]
The Sicilian Expedition Was the Greatest Reverse That Ever Befell a Hellenic Army - [They had come to enslave others, and were departing in fear of being enslaved themselves]
The Athenians Are Butchered in the Assinarus - [mud and all, bloody as it was, most even fighting to have it]
The Athenians Are Butchered in the Assinarus River - [mud and all, bloody as it was, most even fighting to have it]
The Athenians Are Enslaved and Held Within a Quarry - [Crowded in a narrow hole, without any roof to cover them]
The Greatest Hellenic Achievement in Military History - [At once most glorious to the victors, and most calamitous to the conquered]

BOOK VIII - (413 - 411 BC)

The Athenians Show Resolve After the Sicilian Disaster - [in the panic of the moment they were ready to be as prudent as possible]
Phrynichus Sees Alcibiades as a Chameleon - [Cared no more for an oligarchy than for democracy and only sought his own advantage]
The Nature of Aristocracies and Democracies - [The so-called better classes would prove just as oppressive as the commons]
Pisander Persuades the Athenians to Change to Aristocracy; Only Way To Win the War - [If Alcibiades were recalled and the democratic constitution changed, they would have the King as their Ally]
The Athenians Alter Their Democracy to an Oligarchy - [this was the only resource left, they took counsel of their fears]

Athenian Assembly Ratifies the New Constitution Unanimously and Disbands - [It was no light matter to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom]
The Four Hundred Oligarchs Begin to Rule Arbitrarily by Force, not by Law - [Oligarchs more disposed to be reasonable with the Spartans instead of the inconstant commons]
The Consequence of Power Games: Aiding Foreign Enemies to Secure Your Own Power - [the oligarchs preferred to lose empire and freedom rather than to fall victim to a restored democracy]
The Loss of Euboea Causes Panic; Athenian v. Spartan Nature - [the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with]
The End of the Four Hundred; the Reign of the Five Thousand; and the Recall of Alcibiades - [The Five Thousand appeared to be the best government the Athenians ever enjoyed]

BOOK I - (479 - 432 BC)

Sparta's Strength Is in Its Strong Public Spirit
[Enjoyed good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was unbroken]

But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far older tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with the exception of those in Sicily, once and for all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at a very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of the other states. (Archeology, 13-14)

Thucydides' Purpose for Writing
[not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time]

The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time. (Archeology, 16)

The Corinthians Explain the Difference Between Athenians and Spartans
[they were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to give none to others]

Besides, we consider that we have as good a right as any one to point out a neighbours' faults, particularly when we contemplate the great contrast between the two national characters; a contrast of which, as far as we can see, you have little perception, having never yet considered what sort of antagonists you will encounter in the Athenians, how widely, how absolutely different from yourselves. The Athenians are addicted to innovation, and their designs are characterized by swiftness alike in conception and execution; you have a genius for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total want of invention, and when forced to act you never go far enough. Again, they are adventurous beyond their power, and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger they are sanguine; your wont is to attempt less than is justified by your power, to mistrust even what is sanctioned by your judgment, and to fancy that from danger there is no release.
Further, there is promptitude on their side against procrastination on yours; they are never at home, you are never from it: for they hope by their absence to extend their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what you have left behind. They are swift to follow up a success, and slow to recoil from a reverse. Their bodies they spend ungrudgingly in their country's cause; their intellect they jealously husband to be employed in her service. A scheme unexecuted is with them a positive loss, a successful enterprise a comparative failure. The deficiency created by the miscarriage of an undertaking is soon filled up by fresh hopes; for they alone are enabled to call a thing hoped for a thing got, by the speed with which they act upon their resolutions. Thus they toil on in trouble and danger all the days of their life, with little opportunity for enjoying, being ever engaged in getting: their only idea of a holiday is to do what the occasion demands, and to them laborious occupation is less of a misfortune than the peace of a quiet life.
To describe their character in a word, one might truly say that they were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to give none to others. (Speech of the Corinthians, 40)

The Corinthians characterize the Athenians and the Spartans as opposites: where the Athenians are active, innovative, daring, quick, enterprising, acquisitive, and opportunistic, the Spartans are passive, cautious, conservative, timid, and slow. The Athenians take no rest and allow none to others.

Thoughts on Indignation: Legal Wrong v. Violent Wrong
[More excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong]

Men's indignation, it seems, is more excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks like being cheated by an equal, the second like being compelled by a superior. (Speech of the Athenians, 44)

Archidamus' Foreign Policy Maxim
[Be careful not to allow complaints cascade into war]

Complaints, whether of communities or individuals, it is possible to adjust; but war undertaken by a coalition for sectional interests, whose progress there is no means of foreseeing, does not easily admit of creditable settlement. (Speech of Archidamus, 46)

Spartan Disposition: Both Warlike and Wise
[We are both warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order that makes us so]

And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character that are most assailed by their criticism, need not make you blush. If we undertake the war without preparation, we should by hastening its commencement only delay its conclusion: further, a free and a famous city has through all time been ours. The quality which they condemn is really nothing but a wise moderation; thanks to its possession, we alone do not become insolent in success and give way less than others in misfortune; we are not carried away by the pleasure of hearing ourselves cheered on to risks which our judgment condemns; nor, if annoyed, are we any the more convinced by attempts to exasperate us by accusation. We are both warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order that makes us so.
We are warlike, because self-control contains honour as a chief constituent, and honour bravery. And we are wise, because we are educated with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them, and are brought up not to be too knowing in useless matters- such as the knowledge which can give a specious criticism of an enemy's plans in theory, but fails to assail them with equal success in practice- but are taught to consider that the schemes of our enemies are not dissimilar to our own, and that the freaks of chance are not determinable by calculation. In practice we always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor ought we to believe that there is much difference between man and man, but to think that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest school.
These practices, then, which our ancestors have delivered to us, and by whose maintenance we have always profited, must not be given up. And we must not be hurried into deciding in a day's brief space a question which concerns many lives and fortunes and many cities, and in which honour is deeply involved- but we must decide calmly. This our strength peculiarly enables us to do. (Speech of Archidamus, 47)

Archidamus tells Sparta to ignore her allies' impatient calls for action and to move slowly and moderately. He praises Spartan character, a product of practical, limited education, and adds that Sparta traditionally assumes that her adversaries will plan wisely and not blunder.

Why Sparta Voted for War: Fear of Athens' Growing Power
[war must be declared]

The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that the war must be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them. (Sparta votes for war, 49)

Pacifism May Actually Lead a Nation into Greater Dangers
[To refuse to abandon repose for war is not so sure a method of avoiding danger]

'Delay not, fellow allies, but, convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the wisdom of this counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its immediate terrors, but looking beyond to the lasting peace by which it will be succeeded. Out of war peace gains fresh stability, but to refuse to abandon repose for war is not so sure a method of avoiding danger. We must believe that the tyrant city that has been established in Hellas has been established against all alike, with a program of universal empire, part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us then attack and reduce it, and win future security for ourselves and freedom for the Hellenes who are now enslaved.' (Speech of the Corinthians, 68-69)

The Corinthians conclude with an appeal to their allies to vote for war in order to deny Athens her goal of universal empire.

Wise Negotiation Principle
[If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand]

'If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance; while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they must treat you more as equals.' (Speech of Pericles, 81)

Foreign Policy Maxim: Do Not Yield to Force
[For all claims from an equal urged upon a neighbor as commands before any attempt at legal settlement is slavery]

Make your decision therefore at once, either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to war, as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making concessions or consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions. For all claims from an equal, urged upon a neighbor as commands before any attempt at legal settlement, be they great or be they small, have only one meaning, and that is slavery. (81)

Pericles says that to heed Sparta's demands can lead only to slavery. He points out that the Peloponnesians lack funds to sustain conflicts and, being farmers, they will not be able to mobilize for long campaigns; that they cannot threaten Athens at sea; and, as a league of states with divergent interests, they will find it hard to act quickly or decisively.

Fundamental Problem With Leagues or Confederacy
[The common cause imperceptibly decays]

'In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy all Hellas, but they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power different in character from their own, by the want of the single council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous action, and the substitution of a diet composed of various races, in which every state possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own ends, a condition of things which generally results in no action at all.
The great wish of some is to avenge themselves on some particular enemy, the great wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they devote a very small fraction of the time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his neglect, that it is the business of somebody else to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays.' (Speech of Pericles, 81-82)

The Opportunities of War Wait for No Man

'The opportunities of war wait for no man.' (Speech of Pericles, 82)

Pericles Convinces the Athenian's to Value Their Freedom Over Their Property
[Lay waste to your own homes, show the Peloponnesians that this at any rate will not make you submit]

'We must cry not over the loss of houses and land but of men's lives; since houses and land do not gain men, but men them. And if I had thought that I could persuade you, I would have bid you go out and lay them waste with your own hands, and show the Peloponnesians that this at any rate will not make you submit.' (Speech of Pericles, 83)

Pericles Concludes with Rallying the Athenians to War
[Out of the Greatest Dangers communities and Individual Acquire the Greatest Glory]

'This is an answer agreeable at once to the rights and the dignity of Athens. It must be thoroughly understood that war is a necessity; but that the more readily we accept it, the less will be the ardour of our opponents, and that out of the greatest dangers communities and individuals acquire the greatest glory. Did not our fathers resist the Medes not only with resources far different from ours, but even when those resources had been abandoned; and more by wisdom than by fortune, more by daring than by strength, did not they beat off the barbarian and advance their affairs to their present height? We must not fall behind them, but must resist our enemies in any way and in every way, and attempt to hand down our power to our posterity unimpaired.' (Speech of Pericles, 85)

Pericles concludes his speech by advising the Athenians to accept this war as inevitable and to avoid any new conquests or unnecessary risks until the war is over. He suggests that they let the Peloponnesians commence hostilities and reminds the Athenians of their glorious past.

BOOK II - (431 - 429 BC)

Both Sides Were Enthusiastic at the Start of the War
[Zeal is always at its height at the commencement of an undertaking]

And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their utmost strength for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always at its height at the commencement of an undertaking; and on this particular occasion Peloponnese and Athens were both full of young men whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms, while the rest of Hellas stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its leading cities. Everywhere predictions were being recited and oracles being chanted by such persons as collect them, and this not only in the contending cities.
Further, some while before this, there was an earthquake at Delos, for the first time in the memory of the Hellenes. This was said and thought to be ominous of the events impending; indeed, nothing of the kind that happened was allowed to pass without remark. The good wishes of men made greatly for the Lacedaemonians, especially as they proclaimed themselves the liberators of Hellas. No private or public effort that could help them in speech or action was omitted; each thinking that the cause suffered wherever he could not himself see to it.
So general was the indignation felt against Athens, whether by those who wished to escape from her empire, or were apprehensive of being absorbed by it. Such were the preparations and such the feelings with which the contest opened. (431 1st Year/Summer, Hellas, Further preparations for war, 93)

Enthusiasm for war among young men runs high. Most Hellenes hope for Sparta to win, fearing absorption in Athens' empire or desiring liberation from it.

Archidamus' Wisdom: The Course of War Cannot Be Foreseen
[by this combination be best inspired for dealing a blow, and best secured against receiving one]

'The course of war cannot be foreseen, and its attacks are generally dictated by the impulse of the moment; and where overweening self-confidence has despised preparation, a wise apprehension often been able to make head against superior numbers. Not that confidence is out of place in an army of invasion, but in an enemy's country it should also be accompanied by the precautions of apprehension: troops will by this combination be best inspired for dealing a blow, and best secured against receiving one.' (431, 1st Year/Summer, Isthmus, The Peloponnesians assemble forces, 96)

Archidamus, Sparta's king, speaks to the army, calling for caution, vigilance, and discipline.

Archidamus' Psychological Warfare: Athenians Will Rush to Action
[in the habit of invading and ravaging their neighbours' territory, than of seeing their own treated in the like fashion]

'For men are always exasperated at suffering injuries to which they are not accustomed, and on seeing them inflicted before their very eyes; and where least inclined for reflection, rush with the greatest heat to action. The Athenians are the very people of all others to do this, as they aspire to rule the rest of the world, and are more in the habit of invading and ravaging their neighbours' territory, than of seeing their own treated in the like fashion.' (431, 1st Year/Summer, Isthmus, The Peloponnesians assemble forces, 96)

Pericles' Wisdom: Praise and Envy
[when this point is passed, envy comes in and with it incredulity]

'For men can endure to hear others praised only so long as they can severally persuade themselves of their own ability to equal the actions recounted: when this point is passed, envy comes in and with it incredulity.' (431/0 1st Year/Winter, Athens, Funeral Oration of Pericles, 111)

Pericles' Explains the Source of Athenian Greatness
[The freedom which we enjoin in our government extends also to our ordinary life]

'But what was the road by which we reached our position, what the form of government under which our greatness grew, what the national habits out of which it sprang; these are questions which I may try to solve before I proceed to my panegyric upon these men; since I think this to be a subject upon which on the present occasion a speaker may properly dwell, and to which the whole assemblage, whether citizens or foreigners, may listen with advantage.'
Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; we are rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration favours the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if no social standing, advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition.
The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbour for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as regard the protection of the injured, whether they are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which, although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace. (431/0 1st Year/Winter, Athens, Funeral Oration of Pericles, 112)

Praising Athens' unique democratic institutions, Pericles says equality before the law leads to rewards based on merit and creates a society both free and law abiding.

Freedom of Speech - Discussion Produces Wise Decisions
[An indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all]

'…instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all. Again, in our enterprises we present the singular spectacle of daring and deliberation, each carried to its highest point, and both united in the same persons; although usually decision is the fruit of ignorance, hesitation of reflection.' (431/0 1st Year/Winter, Athens, Funeral Oration of Pericles, 113 -114)

Pericles' Views Athens as a City on a Hill
[Athens is the school of Hellas, the model city-state]

In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas, while I doubt if the world can produce a man who, where he has only himself to depend upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a versatility, as the Athenian. And that this is no mere boast thrown out for the occasion, but plain matter of fact, the power of the state acquired by these habits proves. For Athens alone of her contemporaries is found when tested to be greater than her reputation, and alone gives no occasion to her assailants to blush at the antagonist by whom they have been worsted, or to her subjects to question her title by merit to rule.
Rather, the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be ours, since we have not left our power without witness, but have shown it by mighty proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist, or other of his craft whose verses might charm for the moment only for the impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere, whether for evil or for good, have left imperishable monuments behind us. Such is the Athens for which these men, in the assertion of their resolve not to lose her, nobly fought and died; and well may every one of their survivors be ready to suffer in her cause.' (431/0 1st Year/Winter, Athens, Funeral Oration of Pericles, 114)

Pericles says Athens is a model for Hellas, a city worthy to rule others, and worthy of the devotion of the men who died in her cause

Pericles On the Spectacle of Politics - He Views Athens as Something Inherently Good and Beautiful
[Feed your eyes upon her from day to day, till love of her fills your heart, duty to protect and sustain Athens]

So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must determine to have as unfaltering a resolution in the field, though you may pray that it may have a happier issue. And not contented with ideas derived only from words of the advantages which are bound up with the defence of your country, though these would furnish a valuable text to a speaker even before an audience so alive to them as the present, you must yourselves realize the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon her from day to day, till love of her fills your hearts; and then, when all her greatness shall break upon you, you must reflect that it was by courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling of honour in action that men were enabled to win all this, and that no personal failure in an enterprise could make them consent to deprive their country of their valour, but they laid it at her feet as the most glorious contribution that they could offer.
For this offering of their lives made in common by them all they each of them individually received that renown which never grows old, and for a sepulchre, not so much that in which their bones have been deposited, but that noblest of shrines wherein their glory is laid up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion on which deed or story shall call for its commemoration. For heroes have the whole earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where the column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every breast a record unwritten with no tablet to preserve it, except that of the heart.
These take as your model and, judging happiness to be the fruit of freedom and freedom of valour, never decline the dangers of war. For it is not the miserable that would most justly be unsparing of their lives; these have nothing to hope for: it is rather they to whom continued life may bring reverses as yet unknown, and to whom a fall, if it came, would be most tremendous in its consequences. And surely, to a man of spirit, the degradation of cowardice must be immeasurably more grievous than the unfelt death which strikes him in the midst of his strength and patriotism! (431/0 1st Year/Winter, Athens, Funeral Oration of Pericles, 115-116)

Pericles calls upon those who survive to emulate the war dead's valor and patriotism, saying that they risked all and lost their lives, but the renown of their deeds will last forever.

The Plague Affected the Spirit of the Athenian Citizenry
[Fear of gods or law of man there was none to restrain the Athenians from devolving into unbridled license]

Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance which owed its origin to the plague. Men now coolly ventured on what they had formerly done in a corner, and not just as they pleased, seeing the rapid transitions produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and those who before had nothing succeeding to their property. So they resolved to spend quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding their lives and riches as alike things of a day. Perseverance in what men called honour was popular with none, it was so uncertain whether they would be spared to attain the object; but it was settled that present enjoyment, and all that contributed to it, was both honourable and useful. Fear of gods or law of man there was none to restrain them. As for the first, they judged it to be just the same whether they worshipped them or not, as they saw all alike perishing; and for the last, no one expected to live to be brought to trial for his offences, but each felt that a far severer sentence had been already passed upon them all and hung ever over their heads, and before this fell it was only reasonable to enjoy life a little.
Such was the nature of the calamity, and heavily did it weigh on the Athenians; death raging within the city and devastation without. (430/0, 2nd Year/Summer, Athens, The Plague, 121)

Obsessed by death, men sought pleasure with no respect for honor, law, or the gods.

Wisdom on When the Public is Suffering and Distraught
[People make their recollection fit in with their sufferings]

People make their recollection fit in with their sufferings. (430/0, 2nd Year/Summer, Athens, The Plague, 121)

The Athenians argued about ancient prophecies and oracles. The plague struck Athens most severely and never entered the Peloponeus.

Pericles Rebukes the Athenians for their Lack of Faith Seeing Sparta Lay Waste to their land
[The state can support the misfortunes of private citizens, while they cannot support hers]

'I was not unprepared for the indignation of which I have been the object, as I know its causes; and I have called an assembly for the purpose of reminding you upon certain points, and of protesting against your being unreasonably irritated with me, or cowed by your sufferings. I am of opinion that national greatness is more for the advantage of private citizens, than any individual well-being coupled with public humiliation. A man may be personally ever so well off, and yet if his country be ruined he must be ruined with it; whereas a flourishing commonwealth always affords chances of salvation to unfortunate individuals.
Since then a state can support the misfortunes of private citizens, while they cannot support hers, it is surely the duty of every one to be forward in her defence, and not like you to be so confounded with your domestic afflictions as to give up all thoughts of the common safety, and to blame me for having counselled war and yourselves for having voted it.' (430, 2nd Year/Summer, Athens, Peloponnesian invasion of Attica - Speech of Pericles, 123-124)

Pericles rebukes the Athenians, calling upon them to hold the good of the state above private concerns; he describes himself as a wise and honest patriot.

Pericles Rallies the Athenians to Remain Courageous
[Cease then to grieve for your private afflictions, and address yourselves instead to the safety of the commonwealth]

"For those of course who have a free choice in the matter and whose fortunes are not at stake, war is the greatest of follies. But if the only choice was between submission with loss of independence, and danger with the hope of preserving that independence, in such a case it is he who will not accept the risk that deserves blame, not he who will. I am the same man and do not alter, it is you who change, since in fact you took my advice while unhurt, and waited for misfortune to repent of it; and the apparent error of my policy lies in the infirmity of your resolution, since the suffering that it entails is being felt by every one among you, while its advantage is still remote and obscure to all, and a great and sudden reverse having befallen you, your mind is too much depressed to persevere in your resolves. For before what is sudden, unexpected, and least within calculation, the spirit quails; and putting all else aside, the plague has certainly been an emergency of this kind.
Born, however, as you are, citizens of a great state, and brought up, as you have been, with habits equal to your birth, you should be ready to face the greatest disasters and still to keep unimpaired the lustre of your name. For the judgment of mankind is as relentless to the weakness that falls short of a recognized renown, as it is jealous of the arrogance that aspires higher than its due. Cease then to grieve for your private afflictions, and address yourselves instead to the safety of the commonwealth." (430, 2nd Year/Summer, Athens, Speech of Pericles, 124-125)

Pericles asserts that Athens has no choice between war or submission, and that his policy remains correct except for the weakness of the Athenians themselves, who must overcome private griefs caused by unforeseeable plague.

Pericles Explains the Burdens of Empire
[Cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share its honors]

"Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining the glories of her position. These are a common source of pride to you all, and you cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share its honours. You should remember also that what you are fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange for independence, but also loss of empire and danger from the animosities incurred in its exercise. Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has become enamoured of the honesty of such an unambitious part.
For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. And men of these retiring views, making converts of others, would quickly ruin a state; indeed the result would be the same if they could live independent by themselves; for the retiring and unambitious are never secure without vigorous protectors at their side; in fine, such qualities are useless to an imperial city, though they may help a dependency to an unmolested servitude." (430, 2nd Year/Summer, Athens, Speech of Pericles, 125-126)

Pericles points out that the Athenian empire is a tyranny that cannot be given up without risk.

Pericles Posits Athenian's Greatness to her Fortitude: Never Bent to Disaster
[They whose minds are least sensitive to calamity, and whose hands are most quick to meet it, are the greatest men and the greatest communities]

"But you must not be seduced by citizens like these or angry with me—who, if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves—in spite of the enemy having invaded your country and done what you could be certain that he would do, if you refused to comply with his demands; and although besides what we counted for, the plague has come upon us—the only point indeed at which our calculation has been at fault. It is this, I know, that has had a large share in making me more unpopular than I should otherwise have been—quite undeservedly, unless you are also prepared to give me the credit of any success with which chance may present you.
Besides, the hand of heaven must be borne with resignation, that of the enemy with fortitude; this was the old way at Athens, and do not you prevent it being so still. Remember, too, that if your country has the greatest name in all the world, it is because she never bent before disaster; because she has expended more life and effort in war than any other city, and has won for herself a power greater than any hitherto known, the memory of which will descend to the latest posterity; even if now, in obedience to the general law of decay, we should ever be forced to yield, still it will be remembered that we held rule over more Hellenes than any other Hellenic state, that we sustained the greatest wars against their united or separate powers, and inhabited a city unrivalled by any other in resources or magnitude.
These glories may incur the censure of the slow and unambitious; but in the breast of energy they will awake emulation, and in those who must remain without them an envious regret. Hatred and unpopularity at the moment have fallen to the lot of all who have aspired to rule others; but where odium must be incurred, true wisdom incurs it for the highest objects. Hatred also is short-lived; but that which makes the splendour of the present and the glory of the future remains for ever unforgotten. Make your decision, therefore, for glory then and honour now, and attain both objects by instant and zealous effort: do not send heralds to Lacedaemon, and do not betray any sign of being oppressed by your present sufferings, since they whose minds are least sensitive to calamity, and whose hands are most quick to meet it, are the greatest men and the greatest communities." (430, 2nd Year/Summer, Athens, Speech of Pericles, 126-127)

Pericles concludes that all has gone according to plan except for the plague. He calls on the Athenians to cease parleying with the Spartans and to redouble their efforts to win the war.

The Genius of Pericles' Strategy is Forgotten By Vain Leaders And Squandered On Vain Projects
[Projects whose success would only conduce to the honour and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war]

For as long as he was at the head of the state during the peace, he pursued a moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness was at its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly gauged the power of his country. He outlived its commencement two years and six months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became better known by his death. He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a favourable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies—projects whose success would only conduce to the honour and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war. (430, 2nd Year/Summer, Athens, Thucydides' assessment of Pericles, 127)

Thucydides gives an account of Pericles' character, accomplishments, and leadership; and then offers an analysis of why Athens, by failing to follow Pericles' advice, ultimately lost the war.

Pericles' Statesmanship
[Exercised independent control over the multitude. Could lead the people instead of being led by them]

The causes of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude—in short, to lead them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power by improper means, he was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction. Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at once restore them to confidence. In short, what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen. (430, 2nd Year/Summer, Athens, Thucydides' assessment of Pericles, 128)

Pericles's Successors Tragically Lacked Statesmanship
[Committed the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude, producing a host of blunders]

With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude. This, as might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by which they not only paralyzed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home.
Yet after losing most of their fleet besides other forces in Sicily, and with faction already dominant in the city, they could still for three years make head against their original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the King's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders. So superfluously abundant were the resources from which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy triumph in the war over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians. (430, 2nd Year/Summer, Athens, Thucydides' assessment of Pericles, 128)

BOOK III - (428 - 426 BC)

Diodotus Argues for Calm Deliberation Without Haste or Passion in Lesbos Affair
[Haste usually goes hand in hand with folly]

"I think the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of mind."

(427, 5th Year/Summer, Athens, Diodotus speaks next , 179)

Diodotus on the Good Citizen and Wise City
[In this way successful orators would be least tempted to sacrifice their convictions to popularity]

"The good citizen ought to triumph not by frightening his opponents but by beating them fairly in argument; and a wise city, without over-distinguishing its best advisers, will nevertheless not deprive them of their due, and, far from punishing an unlucky counsellor, will not even regard him as disgraced. In this way successful orators would be least tempted to sacrifice their convictions to popularity, in the hope of still higher honours, and unsuccessful speakers to resort to the same popular arts in order to win over the multitude."

(427, 5th Year/Summer, Athens, Diodotus speaks next , 180)

Prudence Case Study: Diodotus Argues That Justice, Punishing the Mytilene, Is Not in Athens's Interest
[We are not in a court of justice, but a political assembly]

"However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in the matter of Mitylene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men is not their guilt, but our interests. Though I prove them ever so guilty, I shall not, therefore, advise their death, unless it be expedient; nor though they should have claims to indulgence, shall I recommend it, unless it be dearly for the good of the country. I consider that we are deliberating for the future more than for the present; and where Cleon is so positive as to the useful deterrent effects that will follow from making rebellion capital, I, who consider the interests of the future quite as much as he, as positively maintain the contrary. And I require you not to reject my useful considerations for his specious ones: his speech may have the attraction of seeming the more just in your present temper against Mitylene; but we are not in a court of justice, but in a political assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make the Mitylenians useful to Athens."

(427, 5th Year/Summer, Athens, Diodotus speaks next , 180-181)
Diodotus argues that Athens' best interest, not justice, is the proper objective of the assembly.

Corcyraean Revolution: Political Violence Opens Doors to Personal Violence
[the Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those of their fellow citizens whom they regarded as their enemies]

During seven days that Eurymedon stayed with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those of their fellow citizens whom they regarded as their enemies: and although the crime imputed was that of attempting to put down the democracy, some were slain also for private hatred, others by their debtors because of the moneys owed to them. Death thus raged in every shape; and, as usually happens at such times, there was no length to which violence did not go; sons were killed by their fathers, and suppliants dragged from the altar or slain upon it; while some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and died there.

(427, 5th Year/Summer, Corcyra, Thucydides' description of revolution, 199)
As the Peloponnesians flee, the Corcyraean popular faction massacres its domestic foes.

The Peloponnesian War Saw Countless Bloody Revolutions Due to Ideological Split
[were made by the popular chiefs to bring in the Athenians, and by the oligarchs to introduce the Lacedaemonians]

So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the impression which it made was the greater as it was one of the first to occur. Later on, one may say, the whole Hellenic world was convulsed; struggles being every, where made by the popular chiefs to bring in the Athenians, and by the oligarchs to introduce the Lacedaemonians.

(427, 5th Year/Summer, Corcyra, Thucydides' description of revolution, 199)

Reflection on the Nature of Civil War - War Proves a Rough Master
[In peace and prosperity, states and individuals have better sentiments. Not met with imperious necessities]

In peace there would have been neither the pretext nor the wish to make such an invitation; but in war, with an alliance always at the command of either faction for the hurt of their adversaries and their own corresponding advantage, opportunities for bringing in the foreigner were never wanting to the revolutionary parties. The sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities were many and terrible, such as have occurred and always will occur, as long as the nature of mankind remains the same; though in a severer or milder form, and varying in their symptoms, according to the variety of the particular cases. In peace and prosperity, states and individuals have better sentiments, because they do not find themselves suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war takes away the easy supply of daily wants, and so proves a rough master, that brings most men's characters to a level with their fortunes.

(427, 5th Year/Summer, Corcyra, Thucydides' description of revolution, 199)

Thucydides describes the evils of revolution
[Words had to change their meaning, honor defiled, revenge, ambition, power, reprisals, treachery, death]

Revolution thus ran its course from city to city, and the places which it arrived at last, from having heard what had been done before, carried to a still greater excess the refinement of their inventions, as manifested in the cunning of their enterprises and the atrocity of their reprisals. Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question, inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable means of self-defence. The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected.
To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine a plot a still shrewder; but to try to provide against having to do either was to break up your party and to be afraid of your adversaries. In fine, to forestall an intending criminal, or to suggest the idea of a crime where it was wanting, was equally commended until even blood became a weaker tie than party, from the superior readiness of those united by the latter to dare everything without reserve; for such associations had not in view the blessings derivable from established institutions but were formed by ambition for their overthrow; and the confidence of their members in each other rested less on any religious sanction than upon complicity in crime. The fair proposals of an adversary were met with jealous precautions by the stronger of the two, and not with a generous confidence. Revenge also was held of more account than self-preservation.
Oaths of reconciliation, being only proffered on either side to meet an immediate difficulty, only held good so long as no other weapon was at hand; but when opportunity offered, he who first ventured to seize it and to take his enemy off his guard, thought this perfidious vengeance sweeter than an open one, since, considerations of safety apart, success by treachery won him the palm of superior intelligence. Indeed it is generally the case that men are readier to call rogues clever than simpletons honest, and are as ashamed of being the second as they are proud of being the first.

(427, 5th Year/Summer, Corcyra, Thucydides' description of revolution, 199-200)

Thucydides Describes the Cause of Revolutions - Moderate Citizens Perish Between Extremes
[Good of the state was abandoned, the party caprice of the moment their only standard]

The cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from these passions proceeded the violence of parties once engaged in contention. The leaders in the cities, each provided with the fairest professions, on the one side with the cry of political equality of the people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes for themselves in those public interests which they pretended to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for ascendancy engaged in the direst excesses; in their acts of vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party caprice of the moment their only standard, and invoking with equal readiness the condemnation of an unjust verdict or the authority of the strong arm to glut the animosities of the hour. Thus religion was in honour with neither party; but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation. Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to escape.

(427, 5th Year/Summer, Corcyra, Thucydides' description of revolution, 200)

Revolution Puts People on Guard: Blunter Wits Prevailed
[Honor was laughed down and disappeared; and society became dived into camps in which no man trusted his fellow]

Thus every form of iniquity took root in the Hellenic countries by reason of the troubles. The ancient simplicity into which honour so largely entered was laughed down and disappeared; and society became divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow. To put an end to this, there was neither promise to be depended upon, nor oath that could command respect; but all parties dwelling rather in their calculation upon the hopelessness of a permanent state of things, were more intent upon self-defence than capable of confidence. In this contest the blunter wits were most successful. Apprehensive of their own deficiencies and of the cleverness of their antagonists, they feared to be worsted in debate and to be surprised by the combinations of their more versatile opponents, and so at once boldly had recourse to action: while their adversaries, arrogantly thinking that they should know in time, and that it was unnecessary to secure by action what policy afforded, often fell victims to their want of precaution.

(427, 5th Year/Summer, Corcyra, Thucydides' description of revolution, 200-201)

Civil War and Revolution Provide Insight Into Human Nature
[Men become hurried and confused by ungovernable passions. Rebel against the law, fall into madness]

Meanwhile, Corcyra gave the first example of most of the crimes alluded to; of the reprisals exacted by the governed who had never experienced equitable treatment or indeed aught but insolence from their rulers—when their hour came; of the iniquitous resolves of those who desired to get rid of their accustomed poverty, and ardently coveted their neighbours' goods; and lastly, of the savage and pitiless excesses into which men who had begun the struggle, not in a class but in a party spirit, were hurried by their ungovernable passions. In the confusion into which life was now thrown in the cities, human nature, always rebelling against the law and now its master, gladly showed itself ungoverned in passion, above respect for justice, and the enemy of all superiority; since revenge would not have been set above religion, and gain above justice, had it not been for the fatal power of envy. Indeed men too often take upon themselves in the prosecution of their revenge to set the example of doing away with those general laws to which all alike can look for salvation in adversity, instead of allowing them to subsist against the day of danger when their aid may be required.

(427, 5th Year/Summer, Corcyra, Thucydides' description of revolution, 200-201)

BOOK IV - (425 - 423 BC)

The Surrender of the Spartans at Pylos
[Nothing that happened in the war surprised the Hellenes so much as this]

Nothing that happened in the war surprised the Hellenes so much as this. It was the opinion that no force or famine could make the Lacedaemonians give up their arms, but that they would fight on as they could, and die with them in their hands: indeed people could scarcely believe that those who had surrendered were of the same stuff as the fallen; and an Athenian ally, who some time after insultingly asked one of the prisoners from the island if those that had fallen were men of honour, received for answer that the atraktos—that is, the arrow—would be worth a great deal if it could tell men of honour from the rest; in allusion to the fact that the killed were those whom the stones and the arrows happened to hit.

(425, 7th Year/Summer, Pylos, Cleon fulfilled his promise, 244)

All Greece is amazed that the Spartans at Sphaecteria surrendered. Thucydides' recounts the anecdote of the clever arrows.

Hermocrates Opines on Human Nature and War
[the incalculable element in the future exercise the wildest influence]

Let him remember that many before now have tried to chastise a wrongdoer, and failing to punish their enemy have not even saved themselves; while many who have trusted in force to gain an advantage, instead of gaining anything more, have been doomed to lose what they had. Vengeance is not necessarily successful because wrong has been done, or strength sure because it is confident; but the incalculable element in the future exercises the widest influence, and is the most treacherous, and yet in fact the most useful of all things, as it frightens us all equally, and thus makes us consider before attacking each other.

(424, 8th Year/Summer, Sicily, Speech of Hermocrates at Gela, 257)

Hermocrates on Unity Against Foreign Aggression
[I am not inclined to ruin myself for the sake of hurting my enemies]

I am not inclined to ruin myself for the sake of hurting my enemies, or so blinded by animosity as to think myself equally master of my own plans and of fortune which I cannot command; but I am ready to give up anything in reason. I call upon the rest of you to imitate my conduct of your own free will, without being forced to do so by the enemy. There is no disgrace in connections giving way to one another, a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to his brethren; above and beyond this we are neighbours, live in the same country, are girt by the same sea, and go by the same name of Sicilians. We shall go to war again, I suppose, when the time comes, and again make peace among ourselves by means of future congresses; but the foreign invader, if we are wise, will always find us united against him, since the hurt of one is the danger of all.

(424, 8th Year/Summer, Sicily, Speech of Hermocrates at Gela, 257-258)

Athenian Success Breeds Hubris
[Extraordinary successes lead people to confuse their strength with their hopes]

So thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the citizens that nothing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was possible and impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The secret of this was their general extraordinary success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes.

(424, 8th Year/Summer, Sicily-Athens, The Sicilians make peace, 258)

BOOK V - (422 - 416 BC)

Brasidas' Strategic Prudence
[Seize the opportunity of the moment]

"But the most successful soldier will always be the man who most happily detects a blunder like this, and who carefully consulting his own means makes his attack not so much by open and regular approaches, as by seizing the opportunity of the moment; and these stratagems, which do the greatest service to our friends by most completely deceiving our enemies, have the most brilliant name in war."

(422, 10th Year/Summer, Amphipolis, Brasidas decides to attack, 306)

Brasidas says that the Athenians are careless and their advance to Amphipolis is a blunder. He divides his force and plans to launch a double surprise attack in order to panic the enemy. He promises to set an example by his own courage.

Spartan Attitude Before the Battle of Mantinea
[Long training of action was of more saving virtue than any brief verbal exhortation]

The armies being now on the eve of engaging, each contingent received some words of encouragement from its own commander. The Mantineans were, reminded that they were going to fight for their country and to avoid returning to the experience of servitude after having tasted that of empire; the Argives, that they would contend for their ancient supremacy, to regain their once equal share of Peloponnese of which they had been so long deprived, and to punish an enemy and a neighbour for a thousand wrongs; the Athenians, of the glory of gaining the honours of the day with so many and brave allies in arms, and that a victory over the Lacedaemonians in Peloponnese would cement and extend their empire, and would besides preserve Attica from all invasions in future. These were the incitements addressed to the Argives and their allies.
The Lacedaemonians meanwhile, man to man, and with their war-songs in the ranks, exhorted each brave comrade to remember what he had learnt before; well aware that the long training of action was of more saving virtue than any brief verbal exhortation, though never so well delivered.

(418, 14th Year/Summer, Mantinea, Both sides prepare for battle, 343)

Both sides now encourage their men to fight: the Argives and their allies with speeches, the Spartans with war songs and mutual reminders of their superior training

Spartan Victory at Mantinea Shifted the War Outlook Back in Their Favor
[fortune, it was thought, might have humbled them, but the men themselves were the same as ever]

The imputations cast upon them by the Hellenes at the time, whether of cowardice on account of the disaster in the island, or of mismanagement and slowness generally, were all wiped out by this single action: fortune, it was thought, might have humbled them, but the men themselves were the same as ever.

(418, 14th Year/Summer, Mantinea, Epidaurus plunders Argive territory, 346)

Athenian View of Empire and Human Nature
[The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must]

Athenians: "since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."

(416, 16th Year/Summer, Melos, Melian Dialogue, 352)

Melian Warning to Athens: You Would Not Want Others to Apply this Harsh Standard of Justice to You
[as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon]

As we think, at any rate, it is expedient—we speak as we are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of interest—that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got to pass current. And you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon.

(416, 16th Year/Summer, Melos, Melian Dialogue, 352)

The Melians point out how useful moral arguments could be to Athens if her empire fell

The Burden of Empire & Tyranny
[Athens must subdue Melos to keep the respect of its subjects]

As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea.

(416, 16th Year/Summer, Melos, Melian Dialogue, 352-353)

Athens is Making the Same Argument Persia Made to Get the Greeks to Submit
[upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or ruin]

Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources are too scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you to come out victorious. You will therefore show great blindness of judgment, unless, after allowing us to retire, you can find some counsel more prudent than this. You will surely not be caught by that idea of disgrace, which in dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same time too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; since in too many cases the very men that have their eyes perfectly open to what they are rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, by the mere influence of a seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become so enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall willfully into hopeless disaster, and incur disgrace more disgraceful as the companion of error, than when it comes as the result of misfortune.
This, if you are well advised, you will guard against; and you will not think it dishonorable to submit to the greatest city in Hellas, when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to you; nor when you have the choice given you between war and security, will you be so blinded as to choose the worse. And it is certain that those who do not yield to their equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards their inferiors, on the whole succeed best. Think over the matter, therefore, after our withdrawal, and reflect once and again that it is for your country that you are consulting, that you have not more than one, and that upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or ruin.

(416, 16th Year/Summer, Melos, Melian Dialogue, 355-356)

The Athenians advise the Melians not to act from fear of dishonor or disgrace, saying that Melos lacks the resources for such concepts and that heeding them now will bring her ruin. The Melian men are eventually executed. Women and children sold as slaves.

BOOK VI - (416 - 414 BC)

Alcibiades the Arrogant
[Views the Sicilians the same way the Persians viewed the Greeks]

"Neither rescind your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground that you would be going to attack a great power. The cities in Sicily are peopled by motley rabbles, and easily change their institutions and adopt new ones in their stead; and consequently the inhabitants, being without any feeling of patriotism, are not provided with arms for their persons, and have not regularly established themselves on the land; every man thinks that either by fair words or by party strife he can obtain something at the public expense, and then in the event of a catastrophe settle in some other country, and makes his preparations accordingly. From a mob like this you need not look for either unanimity in counsel or concert in action; but they will probably one by one come in as they get a fair offer, especially if they are torn by civil strife as we are told."

(415, 17th Year/Summer, Athens, Speech of Alcibiades, 371)

Alcibiades bids the Athenians to make use of his youthful energy and Nicias' good fortune together in command. He argues that the Sicilians are politically weak and will be easily divided; that barbarians will help the Athenians, and that the Spartans, whose navy will remain inferior to the Athenian fleet left at home, will be unable to injure Athens during the Sicilian expedition.

Burdens of Empire - Insatiable Need for New Conquests
[if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves]

"Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made. And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change your habits and make them like theirs.

…by sinking into inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear itself out, and its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in word but in deed. In short, my conviction is that a city not inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting such a policy, and that the safest rule of life is to take one's character and institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to them as closely as one can."

(415, 17th Year/Summer, Athens, Speech of Alcibiades, 372-373)
Alcibiades argues that Athens must help its allies - if only to extend its empire further. He claims that to sit and enjoy what it has, as Nicias advises, will risk atrophy and the loss of her present empire. He concludes by urging the Ateneans to unite in support of the Sicilian expedition which, if it should fail to achieve a permanent conquest, will certainly injure Syracuse, increase Athens' prestige, and incur little risk of loss due to Athens' naval superiority.

Nicias Reveals a Flaw With Democracy - People Fear Social Pressure Just As Much as Offending a Absolute King
[The few feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it, and so kept quiet]

With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust the Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged to sail on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest way possible. The Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the voyage taken away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more eager for it than ever; and just the contrary took place of what Nicias had thought, as it was held that he had given good advice, and that the expedition would be the safest in the world. All alike fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that they would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at all events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt that they should come safe home again; while the idea of the common people and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for the future. With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked it not, feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it, and so kept quiet.

(415, 17th Year/Summer, Athens, Second speech of Nicias, 375)

Although Nicias intended to deter the Athenians from such a huge undertaking, his speech actually fuels enthusiasm for the expedition. Nicias says Athens must send one hundred triremes, transports, five thousand hoplites, and other arms in proportion.

Hermocrates Tries To Rally Allies to Defend Syracuse from Athens
[A man can control his own desires but he cannot likewise control circumstances]

A man can control his own desires, but he cannot likewise control circumstances; and in the event of his calculations proving mistaken, he may live to bewail his own misfortune, and wish to be again envying my prosperity. An idle wish, if he now sacrifice us and refuse to take his share of perils which are the same, in reality though not in name, for him as for us; what is nominally the preservation of our power being really his own salvation. It was to be expected that you, of all people in the world, Camarinaeans, being our immediate neighbours and the next in danger, would have foreseen this, and instead of supporting us in the lukewarm way that you are now doing, would rather come to us of your own accord, and be now offering at Syracuse the aid which you would have asked for at Camarina, if to Camarina the Athenians had first come, to encourage us to resist the invader. Neither you, however, nor the rest have as yet bestirred yourselves in this direction.

(415/4, 17th Year/Winter, Camarina, Second speech of Hermocrates, 405-406)
Addressing those Camarinaeans who envy or resent Syracuse, Hermocrates points out that by aiding Syracuse against the Athenians, Camarina will be defending itself against the same enemy, who if strengthened by the fall of Syracuse will soon come against them.

Alcibiades Defects to Sparta and Advises them How to Defeat Athens
[the surest method of harming an enemy being to find out what he most fears]

"You must fortify Decelea in Attica, the blow of which the Athenians are always most afraid and the only one that they think they have not experienced in the present war; the surest method of harming an enemy being to find out what he most fears, and to choose this means of attacking him, since every one naturally knows best his own weak points and fears accordingly. The fortification in question, while it benefits you, will create difficulties for your adversaries, of which I shall pass over many, and shall only mention the chief. Whatever property there is in the country will most of it become yours, either by capture or surrender; and the Athenians will at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, of their present gains from their land and from the law courts, and above all of the revenue from their allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they lose their awe of Athens and see you addressing yourselves with vigor to the war.
The zeal and speed with which all this shall be done depends, Lacedaemonians, upon yourselves; as to its possibility, I am quite confident, and I have little fear of being mistaken."

(415/4, 17th Year/Winter, Sparta, Speech of Alcibiades, 415)
Alcibiades reiterates that Sparta should act for Peloponnesian interests by preventing the fall of Syracuse. He urges the Spartans to fortify Decelea in Attica and to send troops and a general to Syracuse to lead a profession defense

Alcibiades Suggest He Is Trying to Recover His Country, Not Betray It
[A true lover of his country is he who longs for it so much that he will go all lengths to recover it]

"Meanwhile I hope that none of you will think any the worse of me if, after having hitherto passed as a lover of my country, I now actively join its worst enemies in attacking it, or will suspect what I say as the fruit of an outlaw's enthusiasm. I am an outlaw from the iniquity of those who drove me forth, not, if you will be guided by me, from your service; my worst enemies are not you who only harmed your foes, but they who forced their friends to become enemies; and love of country is what I do not feel when I am wronged, but what I felt when secure in my rights as a citizen. Indeed I do not consider that I am now attacking a country that is still mine; I am rather trying to recover one that is mine no longer; and the true lover of his country is not he who consents to lose it unjustly rather than attack it, but he who longs for it so much that he will go all lengths to recover it."

(415/4, 17th Year/Winter, Sparta, Speech of Alcibiades, 415)
Alcibiades argues that he is not a traitor because he cannot betray a country from which he was wrongfully driven and which is no longer his. Moreover, he adds a true patriot will go to any length, even to aid his country's enemies, in order to recover it. He concludes by asking the Spartans to use his knowledge of Athens and Athenian plans to their best advantage.

BOOK VII - (414 - 413 BC)

Inability to Subdue the Syracusans Demoralizes the Athenians
[Athenian defeat at sea was extremely embarrassing]

The Syracusans had now gained a decisive victory at sea, where until now they had feared the reinforcement brought by Demosthenes, and deep, in consequence, was the despondency of the Athenians, and great their disappointment, and greater still their regret for having come on the expedition. These were the only cities that they had yet encountered, similar to their own in character, under democracies like themselves, which had ships and horses, and were of considerable magnitude. They had been unable to divide and bring them over by holding out the prospect of changes in their governments, or to crush them by their great superiority in force, but had failed in most of their attempts, and being already in perplexity, had now been defeated at sea, where defeat could never have been expected, and were thus plunged deeper in embarrassment than ever.

(413, 19th Year/Summer, Syracuse, Both sides erect trophies, 459)
Naval defeat causes despair among the Athenians, who realize they have never fought a city like Syracuse, which could not be suborned, overpowered, or persuaded to ally.

Gylippus' Advises to Check People in What They Consider their Special Excellence
[Beating Athens at sea has a profound moral effect]

When men are once checked in what they consider their special excellence, their whole opinion of themselves suffers more than if they had not at first believed in their superiority, the unexpected shock to their pride causing them to give way more than their real strength warrants.

(413, 19th Year/Summer, Syracuse, Speech of Gylippus to the Army, 466)
Gylippus speaks to his troops, recalling Athens' plan to first subdue Sicily and then the Peloponnesus. He asserts that the recently defeated Athenians are unlikely to recover their spirits.

Gylippus Inspires His Troops to Liberate Sicily & Exact Vengeance Upon Athens
[And the rarest dangers are those in which failure brings little loss and success the greatest advantage.]

"The fortune of our greatest enemies having thus betrayed itself, and their disorder being what I have described, let us engage in anger, convinced that, as between adversaries, nothing is more legitimate than to claim to sate the whole wrath of one's soul in punishing the aggressor, and nothing more sweet, as the proverb has it, than the vengeance upon an enemy, which it will now be ours to take. That enemies they are and mortal enemies you all know, since they came here to enslave our country, and if successful had in reserve for our men all that is most dreadful, and for our children and wives all that is most dishonourable, and for the whole city the name which conveys the greatest reproach. None should therefore relent or think it gain if they go away without further danger to us. This they will do just the same, even if they get the victory; while if we succeed, as we may expect, in chastising them, and in handing down to all Sicily her ancient freedom strengthened and confirmed, we shall have achieved no mean triumph. And the rarest dangers are those in which failure brings little loss and success the greatest advantage."

(413, 19th Year/Summer, Syracuse, Speech of Gylippus to the Army, 467)
Gylippus urges the Syracusans to take revenge and accept nothing less than total victory, asserting that failure will bring little loss and success great advantage.

Athenian Defeat at Syracuse was a Lamentable Scene
[calling again and again upon heaven and shrieking aloud as they were left behind]

It was a lamentable scene, not merely from the single circumstance that they were retreating after having lost all their ships, their great hopes gone, and themselves and the state in peril; but also in leaving the camp there were things most grievous for every eye and heart to contemplate. The dead lay unburied, and each man as he recognized a friend among them shuddered with grief and horror; while the living whom they were leaving behind, wounded or sick, were to the living far more shocking than the dead, and more to be pitied than those who had perished. These fell to entreating and bewailing until their friends knew not what to do, begging them to take them and loudly calling to each individual comrade or relative whom they could see, hanging upon the necks of their tent-fellows in the act of departure, and following as far as they could, and, when their bodily strength failed them, calling again and again upon heaven and shrieking aloud as they were left behind. So that the whole army being filled with tears and distracted after this fashion found it not easy to go, even from an enemy's land, where they had already suffered evils too great for tears and in the unknown future before them feared to suffer more.

(413, 19th Year/Summer, Syracuse, The Syracusans block the enemy's retreat, 471)
Saddened and shamed by the necessity to leave the unburied dead and their sick and wounded comrades, the forty thousand Athenians finally march out. Having already absorbed reverses greater than those suffered by any Hellenic army, they march in fear of capture and enslavement, their initial glory turned to humiliation.

The Sicilian Expedition Was the Greatest Reverse That Ever Befell a Hellenic Army
[They had come to enslave others, and were departing in fear of being enslaved themselves]

For this was by far the greatest reverse that ever befell an Hellenic army. They had come to enslave others, and were departing in fear of being enslaved themselves: they had sailed out with prayer and paeans, and now started to go back with omens directly contrary; travelling by land instead of by sea, and trusting not in their fleet but in their heavy infantry. Nevertheless, the greatness of the danger still impending made all this appear tolerable.

(413, 19th Year/Summer, Syracuse, The Athenians are demoralized by defeat, 471)

The Athenians Are Butchered in the Assinarus River
[ mud and all, bloody as it was, most even fighting to have it]

The Athenians pushed on for the Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them from every side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other arms, fancying that they should breathe more freely if once across the river, and driven on also by their exhaustion and craving for water. Once there they rushed in, and all order was at an end, each man wanting to cross first, and the attacks of the enemy making it difficult to cross at all; forced to huddle together, they fell against and trod down one another, some dying immediately upon the javelins, others getting entangled together and stumbling over the articles of baggage, without being able to rise again. Meanwhile the opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the Syracusans, who showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them drinking greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered them, especially those in the water, which was thus immediately spoiled, but which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all, bloody as it was, most even fighting to have it.

(413, 19th Year/Summer, Syracuse, The Athenians are demoralized by defeat, 471)
Under attack all the way, the Athenians march to the Assinarus river, driven by thirst and the hope that they would be safe there. When they arrive, they find the Syracusans waiting for them. All order is lost as men rush to drink even the foul water in which they are being butchered.

The Athenians Are Enslaved and Held Within a Quarry
[Crowded in a narrow hole, without any roof to cover them]

The prisoners in the quarries were at first hardly treated by the Syracusans. Crowded in a narrow hole, without any roof to cover them, the heat of the sun and the stifling closeness of the air tormented them during the day, and then the nights, which came on autumnal and chilly, made them ill by the violence of the change; besides, as they had to do everything in the same place for want of room, and the bodies of those who died of their wounds or from the variation in the temperature, or from similar causes, were left heaped together one upon another, intolerable stenches arose; while hunger and thirst never ceased to afflict them, each man during eight months having only half a pint of water and a pint of corn given him daily. In short, no single suffering to be apprehended by men thrust into such a place was spared them. For some seventy days they thus lived all together, after which all, except the Athenians and any Siceliots or Italiots who had joined in the expedition, were sold. The total number of prisoners taken would be difficult to state exactly, but it could not have been less than seven thousand.

(413, 19th Year/Summer, Syracuse, Total victory for Syracuse, 478)
Thucydides describes the torments of the seven thousand or more captives who endured the crowded quarries for eight months before being sold as slaves. Many died. Thucydides calls the Syracusan victory the greatest of the war, and the Athenian defeat the most calamitous and total.

The Greatest Hellenic Achievement in Military History
[At once most glorious to the victors, and most calamitous to the conquered]

This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any thing in war, or, in my opinion, in Hellenic history; at once most glorious to the victors, and most calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten at all points and altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were destroyed, as the saying is, with a total destruction, their fleet, their army, everything was destroyed, and few out of many returned home. Such were the events in Sicily.

(413, 19th Year/Summer, Syracuse, Total victory for Syracuse, 478)

BOOK VIII - (413 - 411 BC)

The Athenians Show Resolve After the Sicilian Disaster
[in the panic of the moment they were ready to be as prudent as possible]

Nevertheless, with such means as they had, it was determined to resist to the last, and to provide timber and money, and to equip a fleet as they best could, to take steps to secure their confederates and above all Euboea, to reform things in the city upon a more economical footing, and to elect a board of elders to advise upon the state of affairs as occasion should arise. In short, as is the way of a democracy, in the panic of the moment they were ready to be as prudent as possible.

(413, 19th Year/Winter, Hellas, Enemies of Athens plan to strike now, 482)
The Athenians are shocked by the disaster in Sicily and discouraged by their lack of resources with which to carry on the war. Yet they decide to resist and take steps to build ships and secure their hold on their allies.

Phrynichus Sees Alcibiades as a Chameleon
[Cared no more for an oligarchy than for a democracy, and only sought his own advantage]

Unlike the rest, who thought them advantageous and trustworthy, Phrynichus, who was still general, by no means approved of the proposals. Alcibiades, he rightly thought, cared no more for an oligarchy than for a democracy, and only sought to change the institutions of his country in order to get himself recalled by his associates; while for themselves their one object should be to avoid civil discord. It was not the King's interest, when the Peloponnesians were now their equals at sea, and in possession of some of the chief cities in his empire, to go out of his way to side with the Athenians whom he did not trust, when he might make friends of the Peloponnesians who had never injured him.

(412/1, 20th Year/Winter, Samos, Phrynichus sees through Alcibiades, 509)
Alcibiades' ideas prove attractive to some Athenians at Samos, who form a cabal to promote them. The general Phrynichus opposes them, arguing that Alcibiades cares only for his own recall, the King wants only the restoration of his possessions, and the allies desire only freedom from subjection. He predicts that no allies will respond to the installation of an Athenian oligarchy with greater friendship for Athens.

The Nature of Aristocracies and Democracies
[The so-called better classes would prove just as oppressive as the commons]

Besides, the cities thought that the so-called better classes would prove just as oppressive as the commons, as being those who originated, proposed, and for the most part benefited from the acts of the commons injurious to the confederates. Indeed, if it depended on the better classes, the confederates would be put to death without trial and with violence; while the commons were their refuge and the chastiser of these men. This he positively knew that the cities had learned by experience, and that such was their opinion. The propositions of Alcibiades, and the intrigues now in progress, could therefore never meet with his approval.

(412/1, 20th Year/Winter, Samos, Phrynichus sees through Alcibiades, 509-510)

Pisander Persuades the Athenians to Change to Aristocracy; Only Way To Win the War
[If Alcibiades were recalled and the democratic constitution changed, they would have the King as their Ally]

While Alcibiades was besieging the favour of Tissaphernes with an earnestness proportioned to the greatness of the issue, the Athenian envoys who had been dispatched from Samos with Pisander arrived at Athens, and made a speech before the people, giving a brief summary of their views, and particularly insisting that, if Alcibiades were recalled and the democratic constitution changed, they could have the King as their ally, and would be able to overcome the Peloponnesians. A number of speakers opposed them on the question of the democracy, the enemies of Alcibiades cried out against the scandal of a restoration to be effected by a violation of the constitution, and the Eumolpidae and Ceryces protested in behalf of the mysteries, the cause of his banishment, and called upon the gods to avert his recall; when Pisander, in the midst of much opposition and abuse, came forward, and taking each of his opponents aside asked him the following question: In the face of the fact that the Peloponnesians had as many ships as their own confronting them at sea, more cities in alliance with them, and the King and Tissaphernes to supply them with money, of which the Athenians had none left, had he any hope of saving the state, unless someone could induce the King to come over to their side? Upon their replying that they had not, he then plainly said to them: "This we cannot have unless we have a more moderate form of government, and put the offices into fewer hands, and so gain the King's confidence, and forthwith restore Alcibiades, who is the only man living that can bring this about. The safety of the state, not the form of its government, is for the moment the most pressing question, as we can always change afterwards whatever we do not like."

(412/1, 20th Year/Winter, Magnesia, Strains between Tissaphernes and Sparta, 511-512)
Pisander and the envoys from Samos seek to persuade the Athenians to adopt an oligarchy, arguing that only by restoration of Alcibiades and the establishment of an oligarchy can Athens hope to obtain the King's friendship and thereby the resources with which to resist and ultimately defeat the Spartans.

The Athenians Alter Their Democracy to an Oligarchy
[this was the only resource left, they took counsel of their fears]

The people were at first highly irritated at the mention of an oligarchy, but upon understanding clearly from Pisander that this was the only resource left, they took counsel of their fears, and promised themselves some day to change the government again, and gave way.

(412/1, 20th Year/Winter, Athens, The Athenians agree to alter their government, 512)
Bowing to necessity and hoping for a future return to democracy, the Athenians agree to alter the government, dismiss Phrynichus, and send Pisander to negotiate with Tissaphernes. Pisander solicits support for these moves from the political clubs.

Athenian Assembly Ratifies the New Constitution Unanimously and Disbands
[It was no light matter to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom]

Conducted by so many and by such sagacious heads, the enterprise, great as it was, not unnaturally went forward; although it was no light matter to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom, almost a hundred years after the deposition of the tyrants, when it had been not only not subject to any during the whole of that period, but accustomed during more than half of it to rule over subjects of its own.

(411, 21st Year/Summer, Athens, The assembly ratifies the new constitution, 520)
Thucydides describes the leaders of the oligarchs and comments that it was no small thing to deprive the Athenian people of their freedom after a century of democratic rule.

The Four Hundred Oligarchs Begin to Rule Arbitrarily by Force, not by Law
[Oligarchs more disposed to be reasonable with the Spartans instead of the inconstant commons]

Upon the Council withdrawing in this way without venturing any objection, and the rest of the citizens making no movement, the Four Hundred entered the council chamber, and for the present contented themselves with drawing lots for their Prytanes, and making their prayers and sacrifices to the gods upon entering office, but afterwards departed widely from the democratic system of government, and except that on account of Alcibiades they did not recall the exiles, ruled the city by force; putting to death some men, though not many, whom they thought it convenient to remove, and imprisoning and banishing others. They also sent to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, at Decelea, to say that they desired to make peace, and that he might reasonably be more disposed to treat now that he had them to deal with instead of the inconstant commons.

(411, 21st Year/Summer, Athens, The assembly ratifies the new constitution, 520-521)
The council departs without objection by its members or other citizens. The Four hundred now begin to rule arbitrarily by force, not by law. They inform Agis of their desire for peace.

The Consequence of Power Games: Aiding Foreign Enemies to Secure Your Own Power
[the oligarchs preferred to lose empire and freedom rather than to fall victim to a restored democracy]

This was no mere calumny, there being really some such plan entertained by the accused. Their first wish was to have the oligarchy without giving up the empire; failing this to keep their ships and walls and be independent; while, if this also were denied them, sooner than be the first victims of the restored democracy, they were resolved to call in the enemy and make peace, give up their walls and ships, and at all costs retain possession of the government, if their lives were only assured to them.

(411, 21st Year/Summer, Athens, Theramenes opposes the wall at Eetionia, 533)
Theramenes opposes the works at Eetionia and accuses the oligarchs of intending to invite a Peloponnesian squadron to join them in Piraeus. Indeed, the oligarchs preferred to lose empire and freedom rather than to fall victim to a restored democracy.

The Loss of Euboea Causes Panic; Athenian v. Spartan Nature
[the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with]

When the news of what had happened in Euboea reached Athens, a panic ensued such as they had never before known. Neither the disaster in Sicily, great as it seemed at the time, nor any other had ever so much alarmed them. The camp at Samos was in revolt; they had no more ships or men to man them; they were at discord among themselves and might at any moment come to blows; and a disaster of this magnitude coming on the top of all, by which they lost their fleet, and worst of all Euboea, which was of more value to them than Attica, could not occur without throwing them into the deepest despondency. Meanwhile their greatest and most immediate trouble was the possibility that the enemy, emboldened by his victory, might make straight for them and sail against Piraeus, which they had no longer ships to defend; and every moment they expected him to arrive.
This, with a little more courage, he might easily have done, in which case he would either have increased the dissensions of the city by his presence, or, if he had stayed to besiege it, have compelled the fleet from Ionia, although the enemy of the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their country and of their relatives, and in the meantime would have become master of the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and of everything as far as Euboea, or, to speak roundly, of the whole Athenian empire. But here, as on so many other occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with. The wide difference between the two characters, the slowness and want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and enterprise of their opponents, proved of the greatest service, especially to a maritime empire like Athens.
Indeed this was shown by the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character, and also most successful in combating them.

(411, 21st Year/Summer, Athens, The loss of Euboea causes panic, 538)
The loss of Euboea promotes panic at Athens. If the enemy besieges the Piraeus, the fleet from Samos would have to defend the city, exposing the rest of the empire. Thucydides notes that the Spartans were characteristically too slow to grasp or exploit this opportunity.

The End of the Four Hundred; the Reign of the Five Thousand; and the Recall of Alcibiades
[The Five Thousand appeared to be the best government the Athenians ever enjoyed]

It was during the first period of this constitution that the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best government that they ever did, at least in my time. For the fusion of the high and the low was effected with judgment, and this was what first enabled the state to raise up her head after her manifold disasters. They also voted for the recall of Alcibiades and of other exiles, and sent to him and to the camp at Samos, and urged them to devote themselves vigorously to the war.

(411, 21st Year/Summer, Athens, The oligarchy is deposed; democracy restored, 540)
The Athenians react to the Euboea disaster by deposing the oligarchy, installing a new regime of the Five thousand, and enacting reforms. They also recall Alcibiades and other exiles and urge the army at Samos to vigorously carry on the war.

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